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1.0 Purpose 
The purpose of this calculation is to identify the initial design requirements for refuge 
stations, including the client requirements, standards, codes, laws, and regulations, 
general discipline design criteria, and design basis events and hazards. The scope of this 
document is for the specific task of designing and constructing refuge stations in the 
Enhanced Characterization Repository Block (ECRB) subsurface openings as necessary 
personnel safety enhancements to the current construction, maintenance and testing 
operations. 
This document is for the construction at the Exploratory Site Facility (ESF). The criteria 
is not intended to be incorporated into the proposed repository design and does not 
support Site Recommendation or License Application efforts. This calculation is prepared 
in accordance with AP-3.12Q as a field support calculation and was prepared using the 
Technical Work Plan for Test Facilities Design FY01 Work Activities (TWP) (CRWMS 
M&O 2000b). 
2.0 Method 
The ECRB Cross Drift is designated as a Test Support Area in the QA Classification 
Analysis of Main Access Openings (CRWMS M&O 1997 Section 7.2). Test Support 
Area systems, structures or components have been determined not to be Quality 
Affecting (QA) by the QA Classification Analysis of Test Support Areas (CRWMS M&O 
1995, Section 8). 
The Determination of Importance Evaluation for the ESF Enhanced Characterization of 
the Repository Block Cross Drift (CRWMS M&O 2000a, Section 13.3) provides a list of 
QA controls on construction activities in the Cross Drift. Review of the listed activities 
has determined that none of these QA controls is directly applicable to the design of 
refuges in the ECRB. These QA Controls will affect construction activities in the ECRB 
cross drift, which have been incorporated into the Cross Drift Subsurface General 
Construction, Specification Section 01502 (BSC 2001b). Therefore, the specific subject 
of this calculation is not Quality Affecting. Unqualified inputs are used throughout. 
A system safety analysis will be required to establish the Functional Class Levels (FCL) 
to ensure that the system, structures and components used in the refuge chamber meet the 
requirements of the Integrated Safety Management Quality Assurance Program (DOE 
2001). The FCL designations from the analysis will be design inputs for implementing 
design documents. 
The calculation consists of: identification of client requirements, standards, codes, laws, 
and regulations, general discipline design criteria, and design basis events and hazards; 
mathematical calculations to determine parameters based upon inputs; determination of 
design limitations; identification of interfaces; and criteria for selection of material and 
equipment. This calculation does not affect any management and control of electronic 
data. 
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3.0 Assumptions 
3.1 It is assumed that procuring medium size respirators for the maximum design 
number of personnel in the station and procuring large and small sizes at 1/3 of 
the maximum design number of personnel for both large and small size orders 
will supply all the required sizes in event of an emergency. The assumption is 
based upon the order for medium size respirator masks which, comprise 70% of 
total orders (Determination, Decision, or Directive Documentation. DF: 02-
0013, BSC 2001c, Section 7). Projecting size quantity needs as a normal 
distribution these quantities are more than double the number projected for large 
and small statistical requirements. The medium size quantity will meet the 
maximum possible demand. No confirmation required. (Used in section 5.2.6.3) 
3.2 It is assumed for the 21 MW fire case that a 9-hour cooling period is the 
minimum time period to allow emergency travel in the cross drift. It is assumed 
for the 8 MW and alternative fire cases that a 2-hour cooling period is the 
minimum time period to allow emergency travel in the cross drift. The basis of 
the assumptions are the fire load calculations results from the Calculation of 
ECRB Cross-Drift Worst-Case Fire and Effects (BSC 2001a, Section 6). It is 
expected that the heated gases will be adequately spread, by natural ventilation, 
along the tunnel surface and that the rock will be a sufficient heat sink to 
provide cooling within the assumed times. No confirmation required. (Used in 
Section 5.2.6.4) 
3.3 It is assumed that the personnel in the refuge Station at Alcove #8 while wearing 
supply-air respirators will spend 85% of the time sitting or laying down, 10% 
standing and 5 % walking. Personnel will be sitting to conserve air most of the 
time. The walking time is for trips to toilet and for cramp relief. Standing for 
stretching and position changes. The basis for this assumption is that personnel 
will be trained to conserve air demand. This assumption is for air demand rates. 
No confirmation required. (Used in Section 5.2.6.4) 
4.0 Use of Computer Software and models 
Microsoft Word, a word processing program, is the only software used. It is exempt 
from validation and control requirements in accordance with AP-SI.1Q. 
5.0 Calculation 
5.1 System Design Criteria 
5.1.1 Exploratory Site Facilities Design Requirements - System Safety 
Requirements 
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"All workplaces shall be designed to be free from recognized hazards that are 
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees. 'Free from 
recognized hazards' means that the identified hazards are eliminated or 
mitigated to the point that they no longer pose a serious threat." (YMP 1997, 
3.2.1.1.2.4.A) 
"The first priority shall be to eliminate hazards by design. If an identified 
hazard cannot be eliminated, the associated risk shall be reduced to an 
acceptable level through design selection." (YMP 1997, 3.2.1.1.2.4.B.1) 
"30 CFR 57 shall apply only to subsurface facilities and equipment and to 
those mining-related surface facilities and equipment specifically addressed 
therein." (YMP 1997, 3.2.1.1.2.4.H) 
"29 CFR 1910 and 29 CFR 1926 shall apply to all other surface facilities and 
equipment. 29 CFR 1910 and 29 CFR 1926 shall also apply to subsurface 
facilities and equipment not addressed by 30 CFR 57." (YMP 1997, 
3.2.1.1.2.4.1) 
"A minimum of two accesses shall be incorporated into the underground ESF 
to ensure adequate alternative routes of egress. A method of refuge shall be 
provided while a second opening to the surface is being developed." (YMP 
1997, 3.7.2.3.l.A) 
"A refuge chamber shall be provided with sufficient capacity and facilities to 
accommodate personnel and visitors underground in accordance with the 
applicable MSHA requirements." (YMP 1997, 3.7.2.4.1.H) 
5.1.2 DOE Technical Direction 
"TECHNICAL DIRECTION - EXPLORATORY STUDY FACILITY SITE 
CHARACTERIZATION DESIGN AND INSTALLATION BASE CODE 
COMPLIANCE. (Dyer 1998) 
The Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System Management and 
Operating Contractors shall insure that all site characterization and test 
support utilities in the Exploratory Study Facility meet the minimum 
requirements established in the U.S. Department of Labor 29 CFR Part 1926, 
Occupational Safety and Health Standards for the Construction Industry. 
Based upon programmatic or institutional needs, this direction does not 
preclude the design and installation of support systems that provide a higher 
degree of protection for the worker or equipment." 
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5.1.3 Safety and Health Standards—Underground Metal and Nonmetal Mines 
All cited MSHA standards in this document are "Best Practice Standards". 
5.1.3.1 Escapeways and refuges 
"Every mine shall have two or more separate, properly maintained 
escapeways to the surface from the lowest levels, which are so 
positioned that damage to one shall not lessen the effectiveness of 
the others. A method of refuge shall be provided while a second 
opening to the surface is being developed. A second escapeway is 
recommended, but not required, during the exploration or 
development of an ore body." (30 CFR 57.11050(a)) 
"In addition to separate escapeways, a method of refuge shall be 
provided for every employee who cannot reach the surface from his 
working place through at least two separate escapeways within a 
time limit of one hour when using the normal exit method. These 
refuges must be positioned so that the employee can reach one of 
them within 30 minutes from the time he leaves his workplace." (30 
CFR 57.11050(b)) 
5.1.4 Application of Requirements 
A hazard of entrapping personnel does exist in the ECRB if a disruptive 
event, such as a fire, prevents egress to the main TS loop. This hazard must 
be addressed to the point that it is eliminated; or, mitigated to the point that it 
no longer poses a serious threat. (YMP 1997 3.2.1.1.2.4.A) In the mining 
industry, this hazard is addressed by the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA) regulations (30 CFR 57.11050) which direct the use 
of multiple escapeways and refuge chambers to mitigate the hazard. 
Based upon the Department of Energy technical direction letter (Dyer 1998), 
which established Occupation Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
Regulations contained in 29 CFR 1926 as the "Base Code" for ESF design, 
the ESF design is not mandated to follow the MSHA regulations contained in 
30 CFR 57. This supercedes the ESFDR requirements which invoke 30 CFR 
57. The OSHA "Underground Construction" Section, 29 CFR 1926.800, 
does not address safe refuge areas or secondary egress. MSHA regulations 
represent "Best Practices" and their adoption does achieve "a higher degree of 
protection for the worker" as allowed in the technical direction letter. By 
using 30 CFR 57.11050 and 30 CFR 57.11052 as a best practices standards, 
quantitative and qualitative criteria are provided to assess the hazard and the 
mitigation. 
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30 CFR 57.11050 (b) requires that personnel be able to exit the underground 
by two separate escapeways within one hour or have a method of refuge 
within 30 minutes from the time the person leaves their work place. 
5.2 Physical Design Criteria 
5.2.1 Fire Resistance 
"Any structure located underground or within 100 feet (30.48 m) of an 
opening to the underground shall be constructed of material having a fire-
resistance rating of at least one hour." (29 CFR 1926.800(m)(12)) 
5.2.2 Atmosphere Requirements 
"The atmosphere in all underground work areas shall be tested as often as 
necessary to assure that the atmosphere at normal atmospheric pressure 
contains at least 19.5 percent oxygen and no more than 22 percent oxygen." 
(29 CFR 1926.800(J)(l)(ii)(A)) 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Threshold Limit Value (TLV) weighted level average 
is 5000 ppm; TLV Short Term Elevated Level (STEL) is 30000 ppm. Carbon 
Monoxide (CO) Threshold Limit Value (TLV) weighted level average is 50 
ppm. (29 CFR 1926.55) 
5.2.3 Refuge areas 
"Refuge areas shall be ~ 
(a) Of fire-resistant construction, preferably in untimbered areas of the mine; 
(b)Large enough to accommodate readily the normal number of persons in 
the particular area of the mine; 
(c) Constructed so they can be made gastight; and 
(d)Provided with compressed air lines, waterlines, suitable handtools, and 
stopping materials." (30 CFR 57.11052) 
5.2.4 Communication with Refuge Chambers 
"Telephone or other voice communication shall be provided between the 
surface and refuge chambers and such systems shall be independent of the 
mine power supply." (30 CFR 57.11054) 
5.2.5 Subsurface Conditions - ESFDR 
"The permanent and temporary items of the ESF shall be designed to 
withstand the applicable seismic environment specified in Appendix A." 
(YMP 1997, 3.2.1.2.1.2.A) 
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"For the seismic design of temporary ESF subsurface Facilities, the peak 
ground acceleration shall be 0.3 g at the earth's surface. This acceleration is 
consistent with Zone 3 of the Uniform Building Code." (YMP 1997, 
Appendix A-A. 2) 
"The ESF subsurface facilities and equipment shall be designed to withstand 
and operate in a dusty environment." (YMP 1997, 3.2.1.2.1.2.B) 
"The ESF subsurface facilities and equipment shall be designed to operate in 
temperatures ranging form a low of 50 degrees F to a high of 70 degrees F." 
(YMP 1997, 3.2.1.2.1.2.C) Note: This requirement is not applicable to the 
one-hour fire rated bulkheads. 
"The ESF subsurface facilities and equipment shall be designed to withstand 
and operate in a relative humidity environment of 13 to 71%." (YMP 1997, 
3.2.1.2.1.2.D) 
"The ESF non-permanent items shall be designed for a 25 year maintainable 
service life." (YMP 1997, 3.2.1.2.2.A) 
5.2.6 Features, Events And Processes That Affect Design. 
5.2.6.1 Design Basis Fire (Events). 
The design basis fire events for the ECRB has determined the duration 
of the postulated fires to be 9 hours for each of the 8 MW, the 21 MW 
and the alternative fire events." (BSC 2001a, section 6.1.5.1, 6.2.5.1 
and 6.2.5.1). 
5.2.6.2 Detailed Design Criteria 
Building codes and national consensus standards applicable to features, 
events and processes that affect the design of refuge chambers do not 
exist. The best available information which specifically addresses 
underground refuge chamber design issues, design options, hazard 
mitigation, and accepted practices is a U. S. Department of Interior 
Bureau of Mines report entitled Development of Guidelines for Rescue 
Chambers (McCoy 1983). The design shall follow the 
recommendations and address the issues presented in the report to 
ensure a functional design. 
5.2.6.3 Site Specific Features 
Compressed air lines, water lines and mine phones exist behind the 
bulkhead at ECRB 17 + 63 (BSC 2001c, Section 7). Compressed air 
lines, water lines and mine phones exist behind the bulkhead at ECRB 
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Alcove #8 (BSC 2001c, Section 7). The compressed airline in the 
ECRB cross drift will be exposed to damage from the design basis fire. 
Although the compressed air line is steel pipe, it uses the Victraulic 
coupling system which has rubber gaskets (BSC 2001c, Section 7). 
The rubber gaskets could be compromised by the heat of the fire. This 
would cause leaks that would decrease the amount of air delivered to 
the refuge chamber. This prevents reliance on air supplied from the 
compressed air line as the primary emergency system. 
If compressed air is unavailable, there is no impact in the area behind 
Sta. 17 + 63 because a large volume of air is available. There is 918 
meters of 5 m diameter tunnel between the bulkhead at Sta. 17+63 and 
the end of the tunnel at Sta. 26 + 81 (GS990408314224.006). A second 
bulkhead exists at Sta. 25 + 03 which could serve as an additional 
barrier, in the event that elevated levels of toxic gas diffuses behind 
Sta. 17+63 (CRWMS M&O 1998). 
If compressed air is unavailable, there is an impact in the area behind 
the bulkhead in Alcove #8. The volume of air contained in the area is 
not large enough to sustain the number of people for the time required. 
This impact can be mitigated. Supply-air respirators using demand 
regulators attached to compressed air bottles must be worn by 
personnel in the refuge chambers, if air delivered by the compressed air 
line fails. The respirators would protect personnel form respired CO2 
build up and any diffusion of CO through the bulkhead into the Alcove. 
The maximum allowed number of miners, visitors and support 
personnel in the ECRB is 30 (BSC 2001c, section 7). Administrative 
control can be placed on number of personnel when Maintenance Rail 
Car (MRC) is in the ECRB, which is the maximum fuel load condition. 
Minimum number of personnel in the ECRB to support activities with 
the Maintenance Rail Car is 5 (BSC 2001c, section 7). 
To ensure proper respirator mask fit for personnel in the alcove, 
multiple mask sizes must be provided or one size that fits all personnel. 
The number of medium masks should be equal to the designated 
personnel capacity of the refuge chamber. The number of small masks 
should be equal to one-third of the designated capacity and the number 
of large masks should be equal to one-third of the designated capacity. 
(Assumption 3.1) 
The bulkhead at 17+63 will be sealed for test purposes. The sealing 
tape is expected to retard the opening of the double wide doors at the 
bulkhead. A two foot by two foot pressure relief door is located on the 
bulkhead shown in submitted as-built drawings, Transmittal Of Shop 
Drawings, Equipment Data, Material Samples, Or Manufacturer's 
Certificates Of Compliance (SDT) For Exploratory Study Facility, 
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Area 25 With Submittal Evaluation Record For ECRB Bulkhead As-
BuiltsAsSta. 17+63 And Sta. 25+03 With Drawings (C). 01-C027-1 
(CRWMS M&O 1999, p. 3). A two foot by two foot opening meets the 
MSHA Clearance regulations for ladder ways in 30 CFR 57.11037, 
and is considered adequate for emergency passage. The height of the 
pressure relief door will required a platform to be installed for easy 
access. The pressure relief door is held by magnets, and sealing tape. 
Pushing with the leg, when standing on a platform will readily open the 
door to provide access behind the bulkhead. 
Since, the bulkhead will be sealed, the air behind the bulkhead should 
be monitored to ensure that the ambient atmosphere is adequate to 
support life. The monitoring should ensure that the oxygen levels are 
within the OSHA standards. The monitoring should also ensure that 
Carbon Dioxide and Carbon Monoxide levels are below the Threshold 
Limit Values adopted by OSHA. (See Section 5.2.2) 
5.2.6.4 Minimum air supply 
The minimum air supply design criteria from compressed air bottles, 
usmg supplied-air respirators with demand regulators, in Alcove #8 
refuge chamber shall be: 18 hours, given the 21 MW fire of 9 hours 
(see section 5.2.6.1), assuming a 9-hour cooling and contingency period 
(Assumption 3.2); and 11 hours, given the 8 MW and alternative fire of 
9 hours (See section 5.2.6.1), assuming a 2 - hour cooling period 
(Assumption 3.2). 
Breathing volumes for the average male: sitting is 9 Liters per minute, 
standing is 12 Liters per minute and walking 2.5 mph is 24 L per 
minute (Homes 1994). Assuming personnel will primarily be sitting or 
lying with limited standing and walking, (85% sitting, 10% standing 
and 5% walking- Assumption 3.3), the design criteria average breathing 
volume is 10 L per minute. The parameter is applicable only to 
supplied-air respirators. 
The recommended air volume requirements for ambient air breathing in 
a refuge chamber is 2680 scf/person/per day. (McCoy 1983) 
5.2.6.5 Limitation on Number of Personnel 
Based upon the 30 bottle space limitation (see section 5.2.6.3) the 
Average compressed bottle life using 243 Cu. Ft. bottle (McCoy 1983, 
Appendix D) and 10 L per minute (see section 5.2.6.4) is 11.5 hours. 
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Based upon an 11 hour duration (see section 5.2.6.4) the alcove #8 can 
accommodate 30 people using one bottle per person (see section 
5.2.6.3). 
Based upon an 18 hour duration (see section 5.2.6.4) the alcove #8 can 
accommodate 15 persons using two bottles per person which is 
sufficient to handle the minimum personnel requirements for the MRC 
(see section 5.2.6.3). 
Station behind bulkhead at 17 + 63 the volume of air is: 
918m tunnel length & 5m diameter (see section 5.2.6.3) 
V = L (7t r2) = 918m(7i (5m/2)2) = 18025 m3 
V = 637,000 cf. rounding to 3 significant figures 
Using 2680 (see section 5.2.6.4) cf./person/day the area behind 17 + 63 
is sufficient for 238 person days. At 30 persons (see section 5.2.6.3), 
the available air will support 30 people for 7.9 days. 
6.0 Results 
6.1 Identified Requirements 
Client requirements, standards, codes, laws, and regulations, general discipline 
design criteria, site specific criteria, design basis events and hazards criteria in 
section 5 shall be addressed by the design. 
6.2 Design Interfaces 
6.2.1 The refuge area will require location in the ECRB alcoves and cross drift 
opening which are Test areas. Coordination is required with the TCO in 
accordance with the TWP (CRWMS M&O 2000b). 
6.2.2 Administrative controls by Site Construction must be placed on the number 
of personnel in the ECRB, for regular work and when the RMC is in the 
ECRB to ensure meeting the bounds of the requirements. (See section 
5.2.6.5) 
6.2.3 Periodic Air monitoring behind bulkhead 17+63 is necessary to ensure area is 
a viable refuge station. (See Section 5.2.6.3) 
6.3 Features Required to be Designed and Installed 
6.3.1 Bulkheads at 17+63 and Alcove #8 must be upgraded to one-hour fire rating. 
(See Section 5.2.1) 
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6.3.2 Platforms are required at pressure relief door to facilitate emergency access. 
(See Section 5.2.6.3) 
6.3.3 Gas detection equipment for the monitoring of the atmosphere behind 
bulkhead at 17+63 for 02, C02 and CO is required. A penetration through 
the bulkhead is required to accomplish the monitoring. (See Section 5.2.6.3) 
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